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LEGISLATIVE REFORM
FEHBA'S PREEMPTION CLAUSE: IS IT A
MODEL FOR PRIVATE EMPLOYERS'
SUBSIDIZED HEALTH CARE?
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1992 presidential election, then Governor Clinton made universal health
care a central issue of his platform. The idea was warmly received by the American
people and they elected him president. After the election, however, many of the same
people who supported the abstract idea of universal health care balked at the reality of
paying higher taxes for less care. During the next two years, both Democrats and Re-
publicans suggested many health care plans, but all failed to win more than marginal
support. Then, as a result of the Republican sweep of the 1994 elections, debate on the
issue came to an abrupt stop. Yet the problems with our current system were never
fixed. Between 50 and 70 million Americans remain uninsured and the costs of health
care continues to outstrip inflation.'
While is it apparent from the 1994 elections that the American people are unwill-
ing to accept greater government involvement in order to ensure universal health care,
something must be done to help those people who remain uninsured. One idea often
suggested is for the government to require private corporations to adopt insurance
policies similar to those already used to insure federal employees. Since 1959, the Fed-
eral Employee Health Benefit Plan (FEHBA) has provided federal employees compre-
hensive health care benefits.2 Under 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-8913, the United States govern-
ment does not act as an insurer, but through the Office of Personal Management
(OPM), contracts annually with private carriers for health insurance coverage.3 It then
subsidizes these policies by "contributing 60% of the average premium.' 4 Perhaps the
most important part of FEHBA is 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1) which grants the federal
government preemption over state insurance law. It states:
The provisions of any contract under this chapter which relate to the
nature or extent of coverage or benefits (including payments with respect
to benefits) shall supersede and preempt any State or local law, or any
regulation issued thereunder, which relates to health insurance or plans
1. Ellen M. Yacknin, Helping the Voices of Poverty to be Heard in the Health Care Reform
Debate, 60 Brooklyn L. Rev. 143, 144 (1994).
2. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-13 (1994). See also Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Fla. v. Dep't of Bank-
ing and Finance, 613 F. Supp. 188, 190 (D.C. Fla. 1985), affd, 791 F.2d 1501 (1lth Cir. 1986).
3. Hayes v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 819 F.2d 921, 922 (9th Cir. 1987).
4. The Health Maintenance Organization of New Jersey, Inc. v. Whitman, 72 F.3d 1123, 1130
(3rd Cir. 1995) citing 5 U.S.C. § 8906 (1994).
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to the extent that such law or regulation is inconsistent with such contractual
provisions.'
This important exception allows the government to keep the cost of the program low-
er 6 and avoid a "patchwork quilt of benefits that var[y] from state to state."'
Section 8902(m)(2) was added to FEHBA in 1977 after the Comptroller of the
United States complained to the Senate about "various attempts by states to require the
inclusion of special health benefit plans"'8 which resulted in FEHBA carriers being
"exposed to varying requirements from state to state and caught by conflicts between
states and the program's requirements."9 To alleviate these problems, Congress enact-
ed § 8902(m)(1)." Its purpose is to "supersede and preempt any State or local law, or
any regulation issued under such law relating to health insurance or plans, to the extent
that such law or regulation is inconsistent with the provisions of the Federal
employees' health benefits contract."'
By providing uniform nationwide application, § 8902(m)(1) allows insurers to
offer greater coverage at a lower rate. This is because the amendment offersnation-
wide certainty as to what the insurer risks are which allows them to more accurately
calculate their risks. Previously, companies were often unaware of the exact extent of
their liability and therefore often overcharged to insure they had adequate capital to
cover any claims. At first glance, it appears everyone is a winner except for the state
insurance commissioners whose powers have been usurped. The insured receives more
for less and the insurer is able to accurately assess its risk so as to ensure a profit.
However, problems often arise when state laws provide protection which is not
available under FEHBA. When such a problem arises, most jurisdictions have held that
Congress intended FEHBA to be "the exclusive source of [a federal] employee's com-
pensation rights,"'2 and have therefore limited the insurer liability. A prime example
is Burkey v. Government Employees Hospital Association.3 In Burkey, the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that state law was preempted by federal law, nullifying any state law claims.
Yet, some federal and state courts have narrowed FEHBA's preemption clause uphold-
ing various state law claims, such as fraudulent misrepresentation. 4 These courts
based their decisions on the assumption that Congress did not intend "such rigid uni-
formity as to insulate a FEHBA insurer from any and all aspects of state law."' 5 The
5. 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1) (1994).
6. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, 613 F. Supp. at 192 n.13.
7. Wormack v. Southeastern Mutual Insurance Company, 907 S.W.2d 163, 166 (Ky. Ct. App.
1995) (quoting Caudill v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of North Carolina, 99 F.2d 74, 78-79 (4th Cir.
1993)).
8. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Fla., 613 F. Supp. at 192. "For example, some statements
mandated recognition of the services of chiropractors while others required benefits for treatment of
drug abuse." Id. at 192 n.10, citing Report of the Comptroller General of the United States, Conflicts
Between State Health Insurance Requirements and Contracts of the Federal Employees Health Benefit
Carriers.
9. Id. at 192 n.13.
10. 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1) (1994).
11. H.R. Rep. No. 282, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 4 (1977).
12. Kizas v. Webster, 707 F.2d 524, 536 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1042 (1984).
13. Burkey v. Gov't Employees Hospital Ass'n, 983 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1993). See supra note 18.
14. Macon-Bibb County Hospital v. National Treasury Employees Union, 458 S.E.2d 95 (Ga.
1995).
15. Wormack, 907 S.W.2d at 166.
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Georgia Supreme Court did this in Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth. v. Nat'l Treasury
Employees Union.'6 As a result of these latter decisions, the nationwide conformity
clearly sought by Congress when it amended FEHBA to include § 8902(m)(1) remains
unascertained.
The Supreme Court has not addressed this conflict within FEHBA. Traditionally,
Congress has left the insurance industry alone as evidenced by the McCarran-Ferguson
Act. "'7 With this Act, Congress stated that "[t]he business of insurance, and every
person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate
to the regulation or taxation of such business."' 8 Congress, however, does have the
power to regulate it.'9 This article proposes that Congress use this power to amend
FEHBA, thereby clarifying the law and making insurance available to more people.
II. MAJORITY VIEW
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Burkey v. Government Employees Hospital Associ-
ation2° represents a majority of jurisdictions. In Burkey, Carey Burkey was insured by
his mother's FEHBA insurer, Government Employees Hospital Association (GEHA),
for 31 days after his twenty-second birthday. During this 31 day extension period,
Carey was involved in an automobile accident and was rendered quadriplegic. Since he
was in the hospital at the end of the 31 day extension, he was entitled to an additional
60 days of hospital care. During this time, his mother attempted to get approval from
GEHA to move him from a Charity Hospital to a private hospital specializing in the
treatment of spinal cord injuries.2 When she was unable to obtain approval, she filed
suit for the costs of her son's care during the 60 day extension period. The Louisiana
Department of Health and Human Resources then intervened to state its claim for
medical expenses incurred by Charity Hospital during the 60 days. At trial, the judge
found in favor of Burkey and entered judgment for twice the medical expense
($44,693) and attorney fees ($40,000).22 GEHA appealed the decision asserting "the
District Court incorrectly interpreted the scope of FEHBA preemption."23 It argued
that at most Burkey could only recover his actual medical expenses; any additional
damages including attorney fees were preempted by 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1).
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed: "the weight of authority and most
persuasive analysis supports the position that state law claims are preempted. 2 4 The
court stated that "whether a certain state action is preempted by federal laws is one of
congressional intent."'25 Upon close examination of Congress' intent when it enacted §
8902(m)(1), the court concluded, "Congress expressed itself with unusual clarity ....
The policy underlying 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1) is to ensure nationwide uniformity of the
16. Macon-Bibb, 458 S.E.2d 95 (Ga. 1995). See Supra note 40.
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1995).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1995).
19. The U.S. Supreme Court stated that Congress can regulate insurance under the Commerce
Clause. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
20. 983 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1993).
21. Id. at 658.
22. Id. at 659.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 658.
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administration of FEHBA benefits; '2 6 and therefore, state law claims must be pre-
empted. In addition, the Court rejected Burkey's claim that his damages were not
preempted since they related "to remedies and not to the 'nature or extent of coverage
or benefits."'27 The Court held that "no such distinction can sensibly be made. Tort
claims arising out of the manner in which a benefit claim is handled are not separable
from the terms of the contract that governs benefits.""8 Such claims "relate to" the
plan under 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1) as long as they are connected with or refer to the
plan."2 9 In determining the scope of FEHBA's preemption clause, most Circuits have
reached decisions consistent with the Fifth Circuit's holding in Burkey. °
The Supreme Court has yet to hear a case concerning FEHBA's preemption
clause but the Supreme Court has agreed with the Fifth Circuit's rationale in relation
to a similar statute. In Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, the U.S. Supreme Court
addressed the scope of the preemption clause in the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The latter is relevant since "ERISA's preemption
clause is similar to § 8902(m)(1) ....32 ERISA states that "the provisions of this
title ... shall supersede any and all State laws in so far as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan .... .""
In Pilot Life, Everate Dedeaux sued Pilot Life for failure to provide benefits
promised by his insurance policy.3 4 The District Court granted Pilot Life summary
judgment based on ERISA's preemption clause, but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed." The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to determine whether
ERISA "preempts state common law tort."36 The Court concluded, "[tihere is no dis-
pute that the common law causes of action asserted in Dedeaux's complaint 'relate to'
an employee benefit plan and therefore fall under ERISA's express preemption
clause ...."" It based its holding on Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts,38




30. The Fifth Circuit is joined by the Fourth Circuit in Myers v. United States, 767 F.2d 1072,
1074 (4th Cir. 1985) ("state law which purports to allow recovery of additional benefits not contem-
plated by a federal insurance contract must be deemed inconsistent [with and] preempted by
FEHBA]"). and by the Eighth Circuit in MedCenters Health Care v. Ochs, 26 F.3d 865, 867 (8th Cir.
1994) ("FEHBA preempted the state-law rule"); and by the Ninth Circuit in Hayes, 819 F.2d 921,
926-27 (9th Cir. 1987) ("state law claims are preempted under 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1)"); and by the
Eleventh Circuit in Tackitt v. Prudential Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 1572, 1574 (11th Cir. 1985) ("the inter-
pretation of health insurance contracts is controlled by federal, not state law"). Some District Courts
also agree evidenced by Liebermann v. Nat'l Postal Mail Handlers Union, 819 F. Supp. 344, 349
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("State law which affords a remedy beyond that provided by the procurement contract
is inconsistent with the procurement contract, and is therefore preempted under 5 U.S.C. § 8902
(m)(1)"); and NALC Health Benefit Plan v. Lunsford, 879 F. Supp. 760, 763 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (5
U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1) "is 'the exclusive source of [a federal] employee's compensation rights"').
31. Pilot Life Insurance Company v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987). Dedeaux was a federal em-
ployee injured on the job. He applied for permanent disability under Pilot who had sole discretion in
determining who qualified for permanent disability. After 2 years, Pilot terminated Mr. Dedeaux's poli-
cy. During the next three years his benefits were reinstated and terminated several times by Pilot.
Dedeaux then filed suit claiming "Tortious Breach of Contract"; "Breach of Fiduciary Duties" and
"Fraud in the Inducement."
32. Hayes, 819 F.2d at 926.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1995).
34. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 43.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 47.
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in which .' [t]he phrase 'relate to' was given its broad common-sense meaning, such
that a state law 'relate[s] to' a benefit plan in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has
a connection with or reference to such a plan."39 It concluded that when Congress en-
acted ERISA's preemption clause, it intended "that ERISA's civil enforcement scheme
be exclusive.!'" When two years later Congress enacted FEHBA's preemption clause,
it again wanted to ensure that all federal employees had equal rights and avoid the
contradictions and inconsistencies that result from each state having its own insurance
laws. It therefore adopted language similar to ERISA's preemption clause. Therefore,
based on the court's decision in Pilot Life, the majority of jurisdictions are correct in
interpreting FEHBA's preemption clause broadly.
III. THE MINORITY VIEW
Some jurisdictions, however, have interpreted FEHBA's preemption clause more
narrowly.4 The state of Georgia is one such jurisdiction. In Macon-Bibb County
Hosp. Auth. v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union,42 Georgia's Supreme Court upheld a
lower court's ruling that 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1) did not exclude negligent misrepresen-
tation. In Macon-Bibb, the Macon-Bibb County Hospital provided post-natal care to an
infant of a mother covered by National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU). Macon-
Bibb alleged it received precertification that the care would be covered and when
NTEU refused to pay, Macon-Bibb sued claiming negligent misrepresentation.43
NTEU, noting FEHBA's preemption clause, moved for summary judgment." The trial
court rejected the motion, but on interlocutory appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals,
based on Pilot Life, granted it.45 The Georgia Supreme Court then granted certiorari.
In reaching its decision, the Georgia Supreme Court ignored Pilot Life and instead fo-
cused on the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency &
Services, Inc.' In Mackey, the Court held that "a state law may have a connection
with or reference to an ERISA plan in 'too tenuous, remote or peripheral a manner to
warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the plan."'47 To determine if Georgia's neg-
ligent misrepresentation state law was "too tenuous" to relate to FEHBA, the Court
examined the l1th Circuit's decision in Lordmann Enterprises v. Equicor.T  In
Lordmann, an ERISA plan was sued for negligent misrepresentation under Georgia's
law. In part, the court relied on the fact that "[tjhe l1th Circuit concluded that state
law claims brought by health care providers against plan insurers 'too tenuously affect
38. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
39. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 47 (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 739, and
Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983).).
40. Id. at 57.
41. Howard v. Group Hosp. Service, 739 F.2d 1508, 1510-12 (10th Cir. 1984) (approving state
law interpretation of FEHBA provisions); Wormack, 907 S.W.2d at 166 (Congress has [not] intended
such rigid uniformity as to insulate FEHBA insurer from any and all aspects of state law); Furey v.
U.S. Healthcare HMO Pennsylvania 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14373 (E. Pa. Oct. 2, 1991); Lambert v.
Mail Handlers Ben. Plan, 886 F. Supp. 830 (M.D. Al. 1995).




46. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Services, Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
47. Macon-Bibb, 458 S.E.2d at 97.
48. Lordmann Enterprises, Inc. v. Equicor, Inc., 32 F.3d 1529 (11th Cir. 1994).
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[federal] plans to be preempted .... "'49 Since "ERISA plan[s] could be sued 'for
run-of-the-mill state law claims,"' 5 the Georgia Supreme Court held that FEHBA
plans could also be sued. Therefore, it reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the
case for trial. Macon-Bibb County Hospital was entitled to damages.
The reasoning used by the Georgia Supreme Court, however, is flawed. It misin-
terprets the scope of the Supreme Court's decision in Mackey. The Supreme Court
based its conclusion that ERISA could be sued for "run-of-the mill state law claims"'5'
on § 502 of ERISA which "clearly contemplates the enforcement of money judgments
against benefit plans. '52 However, FEHBA does not contain a similar section. In fact,
the court explained that "in a comprehensive regulatory scheme [like FEHBA] ...
omission[s] are significant."" Congress first enacted FEHBA in 1959, and amended it
numerous times since. Its failure to enact a section similar to § 502 of ERISA indi-
cates that Congress did not intend FEHBA to be sued for "run-of-the-mill torts."54
In addition, Macon-Bibb is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in
Pilot Life.55 In Pilot Life, the Court held ERISA's phrase "relates to" should be "giv-
en its broad common-sense meaning, such that a state law claim 'relate[s] to' a benefit
plan 'in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such
a plan."' 56 If, as in Macon-Bibb, a party brings a state claim for negligent misrep-
resentation of an insurance policy, the defendant's negligent misrepresentation must be
in relation to something, i.e., the insurance policy. Using "common-sense," a negligent
misrepresentation claim must "relate to" the FEHBA policy and therefore be preempt-
ed by § 8902(m)(1).
IV. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
While courts have reached different conclusions, all based their respective opin-
ions on the policy that "[flederal preemption of state law is fundamentally 'a question
of Congressional intent ... .""' Unfortunately, the courts cannot agree on what
Congress' intent was. In particular they disagree over the interpretation of the House of
Representatives Report Number 282, which states:
The effect of this amendment is to preempt the application of State laws
or regulations which specify types of medical care, providers of care,
extent of benefits, coverage of family members, age limits for family
members, or other matters relating to health benefits or coverage when
such laws or regulations conflict with the provisions of contracts under
the Federal employees' health benefits program.58
49. Macon-Bibb, 458 S.E.2d at 97.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 832.
53. Id. at 837.
54. Macon-Bibb at 97.
55. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. 41 (1987). See supra note 29.
56. Id. at 47.
57. Burkey v. Gov't Employee's Ass'n, 983 F.2d at 659. (quoting English v. General Electric Co.,
496 U.S. 72, 78 (1990)).
58. H.R. Rep. No. 282, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 4-5 (1977).
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In Burkey, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the above as an expression of
Congress' intent to "ensure nationwide uniformity. ' '"S But, the court in Eidler v. Blue
Cross Blue Shield of Wisconsin,'° concluded the same words "show[ed] the concern
of Congress was state laws that conflict with contractual provisions, not other state
laws," ' such as tort claims.
Since the courts have been unable to agree upon what Congress' true intent was,
Congress should amend § 8902(m)(1). The new amended section should express in no
uncertain terms Congress' clear intent that FEHBA preempts all state laws relating to
insurance regulation. Toward this end, Congress should consider the following amend-
ments:
Section § 8902 Contracting Authorities
(m)(1)(A) The purpose of this section shall be construed to secure the uniform
application of this chapter nationwide. Toward this end, this chapter
will be the exclusive source of federal employee's compensation rights.
(B) Subject to § 8902(m)(1)(B), the provisions of any health
plan contract under this chapter shall supersede and preempt all State
laws which regulate insurance.
(C) This chapter shall not supersede and preempt State or
local laws relating to the taxation of health insurance carriers or to the
maintenance of special reserves.
(D) For purposes of this subsection, "state law" includes all
laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State actions having the effect
of law, of any State.
By clarifying any ambiguities, an amended § 8902(m)(1) eliminates the three main
sources of judicial controversy. First, it eliminates any ambiguity as to Congress' in-
tent. Section 8902(m)(1)(A) states in clear and concise terms Congress' intent in enact-
ing this preemption clause. Next, § 8902(m)(1)(B) eliminates any uncertainty about
whether a state action "relates to" the FEHBA policy. Instead of referencing the pre-
emption clause to that "which relate[s] to the nature or extent of coverage or benefits,"
the amended subsection preempts all state actions which regulate insurance law, except
for those listed in § 8902(m)(1)(C). Finally by deleting the closing phrase, "to the
extent that such law or regulation is inconsistent with such contractual provision," the
issue of whether tort claims must contradict a specific provision to be preempted is
eliminated. This phrase was unnecessary because if the contract and State law had
been consistent with each other, then the parties would not have been in court. These
amendments would accomplish what the present § 8902(m)(1) has been unable to do:
establish a uniform rule of law for all FEHBA plans.
By establishing national conformity and limiting the liability of third party insur-
ers, Congress will help to insure that health care remains affordable. At a time when
one is accustomed to horror stories of government waste, FEHBA has proven to be a
59. Burkey, 983 F.2d at 660.
60. Eidler v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Wisconsin, 671 F. Supp. 1213 (E.D. Wis. 1987). In
Eidler, Ms. Eidler sued claiming bad faith. The Federal District Court concluded that since the claim
of bad faith does not conflict with any contractual provisions, it is not preempted by § 8902(m)(1).
61. Id. at 1217.
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model of how employer supported health insurance can work. Given the current envi-
ronment in Washington and the unlikeliness that any major health care reform will be
passed in the near future, it is necessary to look for ways to make it easier for private
enterprise to insure the 50-70 million uninsured Americans. At the moment, many
employers are unwilling to do so because of the exorbitant costs of health insurance.
By offering corporation preemption from state law, the cost of health care insurance
will be lower, and as a result, more employers would be able to afford to offer it to
their employees. While FEHBA, with the necessary amendments, is not a perfect or
even complete answer to the current health care crisis in America, it can make it possi-
ble for some to at least have access to health care insurance.
Brian Harr*
* B.A., History, University of Notre Dame, 1994; J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School,
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